Could a Country De-Islamise Itself?

Tags

America, America 911, American Liberty, Ann, Ann Coulter, ann coulter trump, ann coulter twitter, BBC, big bang theory, Christianity and Islam, Civilisation, convert, coulter quotes, Counter-Jihad, declaration, Defend the modern world, deislamise country, Egypt, Facebook, Iran, Islam, Islamic world, Islamism, Lebanon, policy, policy policy, Turkey, Twitter, we should invade their countries, wordpress, world

Iconoclastic commentator Ann Coulter once made headlines by suggesting that “(America) should invade (Islamic) countries, kill their leaders and convert the people to Christianity.”

Her idea – if it was really an idea – was promptly laughed out of court, as well as being branded an example of a corresponding American ‘fundamentalism’ by the apologist Left. I can’t really argue with that response. If an operation such as Coulter proposed were in any way feasible (or affordable) it would surely be the most worthwhile and benevolent action by a nation in human history. Sadly, it isn’t feasible, nor is it affordable.

Despite that, the idea that a Muslim country can be de-Islamised is not political science-fiction. There are isolated examples which may allow for it, owing to unique historic factors and local ethnic aspirations. I am frequently presented with the idea that Iran (Persia), Egypt, and Syria all have ancient identities which precede the Islamisation of their territories by Abu Bakr and his marauding armies, and for which they might be willing (if presented with the right amount of Western encouragement) to trade their rotten Islamic present. How might this be achieved?

The most notable case of a country attempting to rid itself of the strictures of Islamic doctrine is that of Turkey in the time of Ataturk. Although rarely explicit, Ataturk had little affection for the Islamic religion (or at least its social application) and his bold, sweeping reforms severely curtailed the faith in Turkish society. Ataturk (and his supporters) wanted a secular, Westernised Turkey; one that would bare little to no resemblance to the Ottoman Empire – with all its fanaticism and slovenly Eastern habits. The reforms so implemented were successful and would go on to secularise and partially Europeanise the Republic for over 60 years, before being rapidly reversed by the AKP party of Tacip Erdogan, a self-confessed Islamist and dedicated Sunni.

Turkey’s experiment with modernity was destined to fail all along. Despite their genuine desire to Westernise, the Turks remained overwhelmingly Muslim in allegiance, having Islamic funerals for the dead, Islamic rituals for the young and a large Crescent despoiling the national flag. Turkey did not de-Islamise because there was never an intention of de-Islamising.

A comparable experiment in Westernisation took place in Iran before the revolution. Backed by American and British leaders and inspired by the example of Ataturk, the authoritarian ‘Shah’ Reza Pahlavi enacted massive social reforms aimed at liberalising and modernising Persian society. In the urban elites this was a roaring success. Young middle and upper class urbanites fully adopted the freedoms of the modern world, celebrating the diminishment of Islamic authority. The descendants of these people are now largely living in the West, having fled the country after the Islamic uprising of 1979.

Why did that uprising occur? For many reasons, but one of the most essential is that a nation is not its elite. Working and lower-middle class Iranians (especially those from impoverished backgrounds) were not ready for such rapid change. When the rabble-rousing populists of revolution appeared, they thus found a sizable number of henchmen willing to topple the ‘arrogant’ pro-Western elite. The rest is history.

These days, the Iranian diaspora (descendants of the Iranian upper classes) assures the West that the next attempt at Westernisation will succeed. They may be right, they may be wrong. It will be a while before we can know one way or the other.

In Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, Syria and Algeria, the middle and upper classes are also secular. They too dream of civilising their respective countries; that is, bring the general population up to their own level of personal development. Yet as with Iran, the majority of Egyptians (excepting Christians), Lebanese (excepting Christians), Tunisians and Syrians are uneducated, jobless, illiterate, and supremely devout in their attachment to Islamic consolations. The elite can wish away the days and months, but nothing will change without a long, difficult and expensive process of public education and social reform.

De-Islamisation (of countries, societies, races) is not an impossible prospect. It may happen at some point in the future. But at the moment it is simply utopian, and as likely as the elimination of tradition from any nation, Islamic or otherwise.

D, LDN

Advertisement

The Islamic World War.

Tags

Algeria, American Liberty, Christianity and Islam, Civilisation, Defend the modern world, Egypt, France holidays, Iran, Islamism, Multiculturalism, No to Turkey in the EU, Pakistan, Race and ethnicity in the United States Census, Saudi, Sunni vs Shia, Turkey, Turkey holidays

With news of Saudi F-15 warplanes carrying out airstrikes on Shia positions in Yemen, the formation by Egypt of a United Arab military force, Sunni militants seeking the violent overthrow of a pro-Iran regime in Syria, and bubbling tensions in Bahrain and Iraq, you would be forgiven for thinking an Islamic World War is on the near horizon. You may well be right.

Having simmered and spat for over a decade now, Sunni-Shia hostilities seem to be rushing to the surface in every country in the Dar es Salaam. Despite the likely cost of such a civil war, no Western policy seems capable of arresting it, and the process has an energy detached from all economic or political consideration.

Before looking at where we, in the West, should stand on all this, let us first look at the military, or civilizational balance between the two sides.

The Shia Coalition.

1. Iran.

According to outside analysis, the Islamic Republic of Iran has a military capacity roughly on a par with Saudi Arabia, with the latter’s technical edge sanded down by the former’s weight of numbers. Unlike Saudi’s quarter-million standing force, Iran’s army can marshal up to 900,000 soldiers (excluding state militias) and there is a wealth of dated yet still operational equipment from the Soviet Union for them to employ.

2. Iraq.

Despite the fact the two countries were once bitterly at war, it is increasingly naïve to consider modern Iraq as a separate political entity to Iran. Politically and diplomatically, the countries are in lockstep with one another, and the true source of Iraqi policy is now Tehran. All this means in practice is that Iran’s military-age population has increased by about 20 million and its oil reserves by 100%. If this integration continues, Iran will be a regional superpower, possessing or having influence over the greatest store of extractable oil in the world.

Iraq is yet to develop regular armed forces capable of acting independently

3. Southern Lebanon.

The Southern part of Lebanon (and to a limited extent, the national capital, Beirut) is currently occupied by Hezbollah, a Shia terrorist group loyal to Iran. At war, Hezbollah has proven to be surprisingly capable and it remains armed to the teeth due to historic weapons transfers from Russia, via Iran and Syria.

Hezbollah has between 4,000 and 65,000 fighters.

The Sunni Quintet.

1. Turkey.

By far the most militarily powerful country in the Islamic World, the Republic of Turkey is also increasingly aware of its position as a bulwark of the Sunni coalition. Having wrecked its alliance with Israel, elected an Islamist government, abandoned attempts to break into Europe, and made no attempt to resolve the conflict with the Kurds, Ankara appears readier than ever to play a part in a regional conflagration.

Turkey has already offered Saudi Arabia logistical aid in combating the Shia rebels in Yemen, and has vocally condemned Iranian activity in the region as a whole. The nation has pre-existing links with a variety of Sunni countries, including Egypt and Syria.

Of course, Turkey’s anti-Iranian sentiments may be due to more than religious conviction. Ankara is famously terrified by the aspirations of the Kurds, an Iranic people who possess strong links to Pan-Iranic Nationalists in Iran. Further complicating this is the fact that at least a quarter of Iran’s population are Turkic Azeris who routinely complain about Persian supremacism in the Iranian state.

Turkey can marshal roughly 1 million soldiers.

2. Pakistan.

The only Islamic country to possess an independent nuclear force, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan must be taken into account in any analysis or projection. Virulently anti-Shia, riddled with extremism and perennially unstable, Pakistan has been warmly embraced by Sunni supremacists like Osama Bin Laden, and the country remains an invaluable ally for the Saudis, who are said to be close to securing a nuclear weapon from the Pakistani stockpile.

Pakistan can marshal over a million soldiers.

3. Egypt.

The state of Egypt and its future direction is hard to judge. Despite being over 85% Sunni and the historic birthplace of radical Islam, the government in Cairo claims (for now) to be intent on a pro-Western path of secular reform. Only time can tell us whether this is possible or sincere, but if it isn’t, then the Sunni side of the conflict would benefit immeasurably, Egypt having the second most powerful military in the Islamic world (1.3 million soldiers).

4. Saudi Arabia.

The spiritual, financial and historic executive of the Sunni world, Saud Arabia has the world’s fourth largest military budget and the largest known oil reserves on Earth. Saudi investment companies own a considerable slice of Western meta-economy, granting Riyadh considerable diplomatic influence over the modern world. Saudi’s standing army numbers around 250,000 soldiers, but there are plans to increase this.

5. The Gulf.

The states of the Gulf, namely, Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar are among the richest nations on Earth, and possess small but very high-tech militaries. Gulf foreign policy is usually harmonious with that of the Saudis.

Combined, the number of active soldiers in the Gulf States is 105,000.

The Balance.

Sunni Quintet Military Forces – 3,655,000 – the larger Sunni world having 80% of the world’s Muslim civilian population.

Shia Coalition Military Forces – 930,000 – the larger Shia world having 15% of the world’s Muslim civilian population.

As should be obvious from this analysis, the Sunnis resoundingly outgun and outnumber the Shia. Indeed, if Iran was to fall apart or be drawn into a self-destructive war with Israel, the Shia would be left almost defenceless and vulnerable to outright genocide.

With that being said, a war as large as this can cause a lot of destruction before an inevitable outcome is reached.

Where Should We Stand?

Who should we side with in this developing conflict? In my own view, we should pick no side at all. A mad, religious conflict of this type has no relevance to the Western world, and neither the Sunni or the Shia have behaved in a such a way as to merit our allegiance.

Who will we side with? Well, given oil politics and the economic structure of the world, the West seems predestined to back up the Sunni-dominated order of the Middle East. The Saudis, Qataris, Kuwaitis, Egyptians and Turks are currently allied with the EU and America, while all the Shia states (save Iraq) are considered enemies. This will mean a short but destabilising war, ending in a Sunni victory.

Along the way, America may use the aggression of Iran towards Sunni states as a green light for action against the Ayatollahs. Israel may feel compelled to act against Hezbollah. A direct confrontation between ISIS and the Iranians may occur in Syria and central Iraq. Nevertheless, the end result can be foreseen in photographic detail, a Muslim world unchanged in its fundamental poverty.

I’ll close with an obvious but vital reflection: As all this blood is pointlessly shed in faraway lands, we should remind ourselves how luxurious it is to live in a 21st century civilisation; a condition far from perfect, but one that is infinitely preferable to the alternative.

D, LDN.

Latent Vs Active: A Replacement Typology of Muslims.

Tags

Christian, Christianity, Christianity and Islam, Counter-Jihad, Cultural Marxism, Defend the modern world, Egypt, English Defence League, France, Islam, Islam by country, Lebanon, Multiculturalism, Muslim, Muslim world, No to Turkey in the EU, Organizations, Quran, Religion and Spirituality, Saudi Arabia, Social Aspects, Turkey, United States, World Muslim, Zombies

I’ve mentioned elsewhere that the often proposed division of Muslims into ‘Fundamentalists’ and ‘Moderates’ is unconvincing to me. The distinction is obviously political in origin and obscures more than it enlightens.

I would like therefore to propose a replacement theory, or rather definition, to explain the real difference between the believers who merely pray, and the believers who hijack airliners.

There are, I propose, two distinct types of Muslim in the world; Those who are Latent, and those who are Active. (*There will always be a minority who elude definition).

The Latent Muslim is in the clear majority, accounting perhaps for three quarters of the World Muslim population.

This kind of believer is typically serene and apolitical. He is opiated by his beliefs, rather than stimulated by them. Devout though they may be (and unlike Christians) they often have little curiosity for the battle of ideas.

The Active Muslim – by contrast – is someone whose experience has engaged the less sedating aspects of his faith. He is inclined towards the excitement of violence, death, punishment, procreation and conquest.

These Muslims will fight you until you believe exactly as they do, and possibly even afterward.

Crucially, (unlike with the false Fundamentalist/Moderate antonymy) the Latent Muslim can become an Active believer at any given time. The two conditions are not opposed, merely different, and the Active state is always quiescent in the Latent.

The signature fallacy of EU/US leaders has been to assume that extremism and moderation are real elements of Muslim self-identification; that they are innate, unchangeable and permanent. This couldn’t be further from the truth.

As Daniel Greenfield wrote:

“Politicians… wall off that vast majority of Muslims who did not actually come down to Woolwich and hack at a soldier with a machete and did not fly two planes into the World Trade Center from those who actually did. The hackers and pilots are extremists. The couch potatoes watching at home and cheering them on are moderates. That might be fine if we were discussing a gas station robbery in Cleveland. But to Muslims, Jihad isn’t an act of violence; it’s an act of faith.”

The Latent Muslim, as the name I have chosen implies, is not a moderate. He is unactivated. He lives quietly and habitually, enlivened only by foreign stimulus. It is this Foreign stimulus that tends to change the Latent into the Active. This explains for example, why those Muslims in 99% Muslim countries (Turkey, Saudi Arabia etc..) are largely Latent, whereas those in religiously divided lands (Lebanon, Egypt, Serbia/Kosovo, Britain, France) are more Active.

A more frivolous illustration would involve the mythology of Zombies.

Zombies (in some depictions) are unaggressive and docile among each other, but faced with a thinking human, become drones of monstrous conquest.

In the logic of Zombies, there is no ‘friend or foe’, but simply ‘fellow or food’. And as wrong-headed as we would be to negotiate with the undead, perhaps we’d do better to reconsider our approach with Muslims based on the criteria described.

D, LDN.